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 The Impact of Crossing on Market Quality: an Empirical 
Study on the UK Market 
Abstract 
Since 1998, a few alternative trading systems have been operating on the UK stock market. 
As a result, investors as well as dealers can not only trade on the central market of the LSE 
but may also submit orders to anonymous crossing networks, among which the most active 
has been POSIT, the matching system run by the agency stockbroker ITG. 
By comparing market data from the LSE and internal data from the POSIT crossing network 
over a 6-months' period, this paper tests the impact of crossing on market quality and, in 
particular, on transactions costs, adverse selection and volatility. 
 The Impact of Crossing on Market Quality: an Empirical 
Study on the UK Market 
1. Introduction 
During the last decades, competition has intensified between major market centres as well as 
between established exchanges and new trading systems. Among other catalysts, progress in 
automation and technological innovation have reduced the cost of establishing new 
proprietary trading systems. As a result, new electronic trading systems have emerged all 
around the world and multi-system trading has increased. European stock markets have 
made no exception to the rule. 
New electronic systems, when not registered as exchanges, have been regulated by the SEC 
and designated as Alternative Trading Systems (ATS).1 They include Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECN) and Crossing Networks (CN). The former are defined by 
the SEC as electronic systems that widely disseminate to third parties orders entered by an 
exchange market maker or OTC market maker, and permit such orders to be executed 
against in whole or in part. Though, the term ECN does not include any system that crosses 
multiple orders at specified times at a single price. Conversely, the latter are defined by the 
SEC as systems that allows participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell securities 
and that crosses orders at specified times at a price derived from another market. 
The competition coming from these new trading facilities has changed the structure of 
financial markets, and probably also the role of intermediaries on these markets. The 
implications for liquidity are of much interest for academics, regulators and investors. In 
order to address, at least partially, this issue, this paper focuses on the consequences of 
trading through a crossing network, by testing market and CN private data. 
Concentrating on the impact of crossing on European stock markets is relevant because, if 
ECNs have tremendously developed in the US2, it is still not the case in Europe where only 
CNs have emerged. 
                                                       
1 ATS are defined by the SEC as automated systems that centralise, display, match, cross or otherwise 
execute trading interest but that are not registered with the Commission as national securities 
exchanges or separated by a registered securities association. 
2 According to Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2001), “ECNs are involved in more than a third 
of total NASDAQ trading volume and are now attempting to build market share in NYSE-listed 
issues”. 
  11.1. The development of CNs 
CNs generally promise anonymity and lower transaction costs, but do not guarantee 
execution. In such, they address the needs of a certain type of traders. As a matter of fact, 
institutional investors have long expressed the need for trading systems that provide low-
cost execution while sacrificing immediacy and execution guarantees. This led to the 
development of the Reuters’ Instinet Crossing Network, ITG’s POSIT and the New York 
Stock Exchange’s Crossing Network in the US, the largest of these CNs being POSIT. In 
Europe, two London-based crossing networks3 are currently active on European stock 
markets. POSIT, the crossing system of ITG Europe, was the first one to open for European 
ordinary shares in 1998. It has been followed by E-crossnet in 1999, but still has the biggest 
market share. 
These crossing networks match buy and sell orders periodically, at specified times of the 
trading day. At the hour of a match, buy and sell orders are matched in order to maximise 
the trading volume but without calculating any transaction price. Executed orders are 
crossed at the central market mid-quote. 
As a result, since 1998, institutional investors and broker dealers have several venues to trade 
on the UK stock market: they can either submit an order to the central market of the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) or submit it to an CN. In the former case, they incur the bid-ask spread 
but get higher execution guarantee. In the latter case, their probability of execution is little 
but they are provided anonymity, they incur no adverse selection cost as their orders are not 
visible from the rest of the market and if executed, they trade at the mid-quote with no 
implicit transaction costs. 
1.2. The theoretical debate 
The development of CNs in Europe raises several questions around the trade-off between the 
benefits of competition and the potential costs of order flow fragmentation. The debate 
began in 1979, with Hamilton, who pointed out the two opposite effects of multi-market 
trading and the deviation of a part of the order flow from the central market. Either multi-
system trading increases competition among liquidity providers and thus reduces bid-ask 
spreads, or, conversely, the fragmentation of the order flow between several locations lowers 
economies of scale and probabilities of execution, resulting in higher volatility and spreads. 
                                                       
3 Let us note that an other brokerage firm, Garban, has also began to run some crosses on the UK 
market. 
  2On the one hand, multi-market trading models predict that the fragmentation of the order 
flow will reduce liquidity. According to Mendelson (1987), the dispersal of orders between 
several markets lowers the probability of execution and lowers liquidity. Chowdry and 
Nanda (1991) show that informed trade volumes get higher with the number of markets : 
market makers incur higher adverse selection costs but trade prices are more efficient. 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model a dealership market with competition for order 
flow coming from a CN. They show that the deviation of some orders from the exchange on 
to the CN and unexecuted orders coming back to the market from the CN make the market 
riskier, so that market makers widen their spreads. The CN makes long lived informational 
advantages more profitable and increase adverse selection. 
1.3. Objective and general organisation of the paper 
CNs allow informed traders to submit orders anonymously with no public disclosure. This 
new opportunity for informed traders may well increase the cost of information asymmetry. 
Besides, by fragmenting the order flow, CNs may also lower the informational content of 
trades. These negative effects will be referred to as the fragmentation effect. On the other hand, 
giving the opportunity to trade at the mid-quote, CNs such as POSIT contribute to reduce 
the average cost of trading, increase the competition between liquidity providers, as market 
makers and limit order traders, resulting in lower bid-ask spreads, and finally, if they bring 
informed traders to trade higher volumes, the higher proportion of informed transactions 
could well enhance efficiency. Such positive effects will be referred to as the competition effect. 
This paper empirically investigates which of these theoretical effects is actually dominant on 
the UK stock market, by analysing the impact on the market of orders submitted and crossed 
into POSIT, over a six months’ period. It is organised as follows. Section 2 provides 
information on the organisation of the UK stock market. Section 3 presents the workings of 
the POSIT crossing network. Section 4 describes the data and lays out the tested hypotheses. 
Methodology and results are developed in section 5. 
2.  The organisation and the workings of the UK stock market 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) administers three stock markets: the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) for domestic small and growing companies, the Domestic Equity 
Market (DEM) for ordinary shares of UK, Channel Islands and Isle of Man companies and 
other companies with primary UK listing (principally Irish companies), and the International 
Equity Market (IEM) for non-UK stocks. 
  3Three trading platforms are operating for the DEM and the AIM: SETS, SEAQ and SEATS 
PLUS. SETS is the trading platform for most liquid stocks of the DEM. SEAQ is the main 
trading platform for non SETS domestic equity market securities and SEATS PLUS is the 
trading platform for less liquid domestic stocks (SEATS securities) and AIM securities. 
2.1. The Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service (SETS) 
SETS is the electronic order book that replaced the quote-driven competing market maker 
system for most liquid domestic equity market securities. These securities are either 
constituents of the FTSE 100 Share Index, or UK constituents of the Eurotop 300 Index, or 
securities that have individual stock options traded on LIFFE. 
The trading day for SETS securities runs from 8:00  am to 4.30  pm subject to a random 
opening and closing time adjustment. The trading day begins with an opening auction, then 
goes on with a continuous auction, and ends with a closing auction. Auctions may also take 
place during the trading day triggered by substantial price movements. 
Auctions are preceded by an auction call period during which member firms are permitted 
to enter and delete only two types of orders on the order book: limit orders and market 
orders.4 At the opening, the auction call period lasts from 7:50 am to a random time between 
8:00:00  am and 8:00:30  am (“the random start period”). At the end of this random start 
period, the order book is frozen and an auction matching algorithm is run.5 Once the auction 
matching process is complete, continuous trading begins. Four types of order can be input 
during continuous trading: limit orders, at best orders,6 execute and eliminate orders7 and fill 
or kill orders.8 Automatic execution suspensions may occur if the execution of an order other 
than fill or kill causes a price movement exceeding 5% against the last transaction price. In 
that case, trading is suspended during 5 minutes then an auction call period takes place. 
                                                       
4 Market orders have a specified size but are entered without a price. They can only be input during 
an auction call period. 
5 This calculates the price at which the maximum volume of shares in each security can be traded. All 
orders that can be executed at this price will be executed automatically, subject to the price and time 
priorities. If the auction matching process results in a price which is 20% above or below the price of 
the last automatically executed trade of the previous business day, then auction matching is 
temporarily halted. The auction call period is then extended for 2 minutes. At the end of this 
extension, the auction matching process is run again and there will be no further price checks. 
6 No limit price is specified on an at best order, which is executed at as many different prices as 
necessary until the order is completed in full. As much of the order as possible will be executed 
immediately and any remainder will be cancelled. 
7 Execute and eliminate orders allow participants to fill as much of their order as is available on the 
order book up or down to a specified limit price. So, they are entered with a quantity and a limit price. 
They are executed immediately for as much as possible and any unexecuted portion will be cancelled. 
  4Finally, the closing auction call period begins at 4:30 pm and ends at a random time between 
4:35:00 pm and 4:35:30 pm (“random close time”). At the random close price, the auction-
matching algorithm is run, in the same way as the opening auction. Moreover, if the total 
volume that would execute is less than a pre-determined multiple of the Normal Market Size 
(NMS)9 of the security, then auction matching will not occur. 
Besides, particularly large trades or trades with non-standard conditions can be negotiated 
away from the order book, enabling member brokerage firms to commit risk capital to large 
trades. 
2.2. SEAQ 
SEAQ is the screen based competitive market making segment of the Exchange trading 
system for non order book domestic equity securities. A SEAQ security is a domestic equity 
market security for which a minimum of two market makers register with the Exchange. 
Each market maker is obliged to display firm two-way prices on SEAQ in the NMS,10 or 
reduced NMS in the case of reduced size market makers11, during the Mandatory Quote 
Period (MQP), which lasts from 8:00 am to 4:30 am. From 7:30 am to 8:00 am, quotes may be 
opened but prices are regarded as being indicative only. From 4:30 pm to 5:15 pm, market 
makers may continue to display firm quotes but are not obliged to do so and the trading 
system remains open for trading reporting. 
During the trading day, the best bid and best offer prices quoted by market makers on SEAQ 
are commonly referred to as the yellow strip. In the event that quotations by or more market 
makers are identical in terms of price, the best quote will be the one that was entered first. 
Besides, three auctions, where only limit orders can be submitted, are run during the trading 
day for SEAQ securities that are part of the FTSE 250 Share Index. The SEAQ auction times 
are 11:00 am, 3:00 pm and 4:45 pm. These auctions were turned into crosses in April 2001, but 
nearly no transactions are effectively executed through these batch algorithms. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 A fill or kill order must be entered with a quantity and may be defined with a limit price. It will be 
executed either in full or not at all and non-executed fill or kill orders do not sit on the book. 
9 For a SETS security, the NMS is a quantity specified by the Exchange according to the average size of 
trades over the last 12 months. The pre-determined multiples for the closing volume check are 0,5 for 
securities with a NMS of 5000 or more, or the aggregate executable volume of 2500 for securities with 
a NMS of below 5000. 
10 The NMS classification of SEAQ securities are reviewed quarterly using the following formula: 
(value of customer turnover in previous 12 months in £)/(closing mid-price on last day of 
quarter×10000). NMS’s are then rounded up or down to one of the following bands: 100, 200, 500, 
1000, 2000, 3000, 5000, 10000, 15000, 25000, 50000, 75000, 100000, 150000, 200000. 
11 Some market makers are granted special permission to display prices in smaller quantities than 
NMS. The reduced NMS is half the NMS rounded down to the nearest NMS band. 
  52.3. SEATS PLUS 
SEATS PLUS is the Stock Exchange Alternative Trading Service for the trading SEATS and 
AIM securities. It is a mixed system which supports the entry of both market makers’ quotes 
and orders. NMS for SEATS securities is set at 1000 shares and NMS for AIM securities falls 
under the same regime as used for SEAQ securities. Three types of orders are available for 
entry on SEATS PLUS: firm exposure orders (limit orders), indicative exposure orders12 and 
hit orders (order submitted to execute automatically against a firm exposure order). The 
entry of exposure orders is allowed throughout the trade reporting period (7:15 am-5:15 pm). 
Yet, the entry of hit orders is restricted to the MQP. 
3.  The POSIT crossing network 
Run by the agency stockbroker ITG, POSIT is an intra-day electronic trading system,13 which 
matches buy and sell orders at predetermined times in the day. The system is totally 
anonymous and reduces transaction costs by using mid-market pricing for execution. It was 
created in 1987, as a joint venture between ITG Inc. and BARRA Inc., the California based 
quantitative house, in response to the dealing inefficiencies in the US equity market, 
primarily with respect to smaller, less traded, stocks and in particular in response to the 
issues of market impact. As a matter of fact, "opening" to the market a decision to buy or sell 
a less liquid stock would often result in a major shift in the share price of that stock, with 
little or no turnover having taken place. This led to reluctance from institutional investors to 
even pass orders to the market in such stocks. ITG crossing technology aims at addressing 
these inefficiencies. 
Already operating in the US and the Australian markets, POSIT was launched in Europe in 
1998, and is now working in ten European countries (UK, Germany, Switzerland, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Finland). 
3.2. The crossing technology and the matching times 
Orders can be submitted to POSIT continuously, at any time of the trading day. Anonymity 
is protected and order details are never divulged externally or disclosed to the market. 
Submissions are free of charge. 
                                                       
12 An indicative exposure order indicates a price at which the person on whose behalf the order is 
displayed may be prepared to deal. 
13 POSIT stands for Portfolio System for Institutional Traders. 
  6The proprietary matching algorithm within POSIT is run at designated times each day. In 
order not to allow gaming and manipulating strategies, at the designated time of a match, a 
random execution time within a seven minute window is generated from the POSIT 
computer so that no one, neither clients nor the trading desk, is aware of the exact match 
time. Any order received before the designated match time will be included in the match 
pool, but any order received after the start of the match window will be taken on a best 
endeavour basis up to the time the match is run. Any order subsequently received would be 
for the next scheduled match. 
The POSIT algorithm compares all submitted orders confidentially and is set to maximise the 
total value of shares traded, given the constraints14 associated with submitted orders. 
Matching orders are crossed at the ruling mid-price taken from the lead market quote for 
each stock,15 and reported to the relevant authority after execution. Only executed orders are 
charges a 10 basis points brokerage commission. 
The match timetable (in UK time) consists of six intra-day matching times as follows: 9:00 
am, 10:00 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 2:00 pm, 3:00 pm, and according to trading activity, some 
days, a seventh match is also run at 4:00 pm. 
Table 1 
POSIT match times (UK time) 
Period Match  times 
18 nov 1998 – 19 sep 1999  11:00 am, 15:00 pm 
20 sep 1999 – 9 jan 2000  9:30 am, 11:00 am, 3:00 pm 
10 jan 2000 – 27 mar 2000  9:30 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 3:00 pm 
28 mar 2000 – 29 nov 2000  9:30 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 3:00 pm, (4:00 pm) 
30 nov 2000 – 15 jan 2001  8:30 am, 9:30 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 3:00 pm, (4:00 pm) 
16 jan 2001 – 18 mar 2001  8:45 am, 9:30 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 3:00 pm, (4:00 pm) 
From 19 mar 2000  9:00 am, 10:00 am, 11:00 am, 12:00 am, 2:00 am, 3:00 pm, (4:00 pm) 
Lines in grey correspond to the observation period. 
 
                                                       
14 Clients can associate different types of constraints on the orders they submit to POSIT, so as to avoid 
unfavourable match executions. These constraints are detailed in Appendix 1. 
15 POSIT technology also offers clients the ability to generate trades that require market prints (e.g. 
internal crosses across different underlying clients) by means of "directed crosses". These bespoke 
matches may take place at any time during the trading day, outside of the normal scheduled match 
times and may use the standard POSIT mid-point pricing or some other benchmark pricing, e.g. 
VWAP. These directed crosses are excluded from our dataset. 
  7This current timetable results from several changes summarised in table 1. When ITG Europe 
launched POSIT for UK equities in November 1998, only two daily matches were run at 
11:00 am and at 3:00 pm. A third match was introduced at 9:30 am, in September 1999 and a 
further one, at midday, was added in January 2000. Then, in March 2000, the unofficial 
4:00 pm match was introduced. A new 8:30 am was added in November 2000 and moved to 
8:45 am in January 2001. Finally, the match times were moved to the current hourly timetable 
in March 2001. 
4.  Data and testable hypotheses 
The data used in the empirical investigations consist of LSE high frequency market data for 
all UK domestic stocks, over a six months’ period from July to December 2000, and of POSIT 
order data, for UK stocks, on the same period of time. 
4.1. Market data 
Tick by tick market data from the London stock market include transaction data and best 
prices data. Best prices correspond to the best bid and offer market makers' quotes for SEAQ 
and SEATS stocks and to the best limit prices from the order book for SETS stocks. Quantities 
associated to best prices are not available so that the NMS is used as a proxy. 
4.2. POSIT data 
We have been provided with POSIT data over the same observation period. These data 
consisted of two SQL tables. One table included the characteristics of the orders submitted in 
the CN, such as the ITG code identifying the stock, the size of the order in number of shares, 
the type of the initiator, that is "institutional investor" or "broker-dealer", the constraints 
associated with order and the date and time of the match to which the order is being 
submitted. The second table included the characteristics of the orders executed in the CN: the 
stock ITG code, the executed quantity, the type of initiator, the mid-price used for execution 
and the date and time of the corresponding match. 
All these characteristics are used for the empirical tests, except the constraints associated to 
the orders (see Appendix 1) as they convey no relevant information for our purpose. 
Before running any empirical tests, these raw data have been rearranged for the purpose of 
the research in a few ways. First, the submission table was merged with the execution table, 
so as to allow to exhibit for each submission whether it is totally or partially executed, or not 
executed at all. Then, we established the correspondence between the stock ITG codes and 
the ISIN codes used to identify stocks in the LSE market database. Finally, a procedure was 
  8set up to determine whether a submission to POSIT was made for the first time or whether it 
was an order resubmitted after remaining unexecuted in the previous match. In the end, a 
single table was built up. It contains, for each submission to POSIT: the stock ITG code, the 
ISIN code, the date and time of the match that is submitted to, the type of the initiator, the 
submitted quantity, the executed quantity and the price of execution if any. 
4.3. The sample 
The study is first restricted to SEAQ stocks, as POSIT has been particularly active on these 
stocks since its launch, and will further be extended to SETS equities. 
During the observation period, that is 127 trading days from July to December 2000, SEAQ 
market-makers quoted prices for 1657 domestic stocks, among which 1647 were priced in 
GBP (either pennies or pounds) and 10 were priced in USD. Over the 1647 GBP quoted 
stocks, 1643 were effectively traded while no transaction took place for 4 of them. The total 
amount in GBP traded over these 1643 stocks was 80 450 millions, that is 44 325 millions in 
number of shares. Over these volumes, 955 millions of GBP (379 millions of shares) were 
traded through POSIT, which equals 1,22% of the whole volume traded on the market over 
the 6-months' observation period. Details on intra-day trading activity for these 1643 stocks 
are given in tables 2 and 3. 
Then, most illiquid stocks were eliminated from this sample, to avoid strange effects due to 
extreme values. Looking at the distribution of average quoted spreads across the sample, it 
appears that the average quoted spread is under 30% for 98,1% of the 1643 stocks, which 
represents 99,99% of the total traded volume over the observation period for these stocks. 
Henceforth, excluding the stocks16 for which the average quoted spread exceeds 30% does 
not substantially distort the sample. 
Furthermore, we require that every stock included in the sample was effectively quoted by 
SEAQ market makers during at least 100 days of the observation period, in order to get 
similar numbers of daily observations (i.e. between 100 and 127) for all the stocks and thus to 
make empirical variables comparable on an inter-stock basis. 
Following these criteria, the sample is then reduced to 1451 stocks, from which one is 
excluded because effective spreads applied on transactions for this stock can not be 
computed.17 
                                                       
16 These equities are generally very low-priced stocks, with very little trading volumes, which explains 
their incredibly high spreads. 
17 To determine the side of a trade, we use two conditions: the side officially reported by the market 
maker who declared the trade and the difference between the transaction price and the current mid-
  9Table 2 
Trading volumes for UK GBP-priced SEAQ stocks 
GBP volumes traded 
throughout the trading day18 
Total over the period  Average per day 
On the market  78 391 147 702  617 253 132 
In POSIT  954 583 303  7 516 404 
% in POSIT  1,22%  1,22% 
Table 3 
Number of trades for UK GBP-priced SEAQ stocks 
Number of trades 
throughout the trading day 
Total over the period  Average per day  Average size of 
trade in GBP 
On the market  2 261 930  17 810  34 657 
In POSIT  7 685  61  124 204 
% in POSIT  0,34%  0,34%  --- 
 
Consequently, the final sample consists of 1450 SEAQ stocks. Orders were submitted into 
POSIT for 1262 of them, out of which 562 were traded at least once in the CN. The POSIT 
share in total traded volume exceeded 1% for 275 of these stocks and exceeded 5% for 22. 
73 718 millions of GBP were traded on the stocks of the sample from July to December 2000, 
over which 1,27%, that is 935 millions, were transacted through POSIT. These 73 718 millions 
of GBP represented 2,17 millions of transactions, on which 0,35% (i.e. 7 534 trades) were 
POSIT-executed orders. Such is the case because the average size of a trade in POSIT is 3,7 
times the average size of a trade on the market. These figures are set out in Tables 4 and 5. 
Table 4 
Trading volumes for the stocks of the sample 
GBP volumes traded 
throughout the trading day 
Total over the period  Average per day 
On the market  73 717 626 148  580 453 749 
In POSIT  934 722 524  7 360 020 
% in POSIT  1,27%  --- 
                                                                                                                                                                      
quote at the time of the trade. Following Lee and Ready (1991), a positive difference is supposed to 
indicate a purchase while a negative difference would indicate a sale. In case of contradiction between 
both conditions, we consider that the side of the trade is unknown and that the effective spread 
applied on the transaction ( ) can not be computed.  midquote midquote price trade −
18 Overnight transactions are excluded from the analysis as POSIT is only working during the day. The 
trading intra-day period we consider lays from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, as we noticed that trading volumes 
keep high till 5:00 pm, even if the MQP closes at 4:30 pm. 
  10Table 5 
Number of trades for the stocks of the sample 
Number of trades 
throughout the trading day 
Total over the period  Average per day  Average size of 
trade in GBP 
On the market 
       - buying orders 
        - selling orders 
2 170 504 








In POSIT  7 534  59  124 067 
% in POSIT  0,35%  ---  --- 
 
Throughout the observation period, the market was rather bearish. The cross-sectional 
average close-to-close return rose to –0,0659% for the sample. This average is obtained as 
follows. First, for each stock of the sample, the equally weighted mean of daily returns is 
calculated in logarithm on closing mid quotes. Second, a mean of the individual average 
returns is computed, weighting each stock by the total volume traded on the stock over the 
period. 
The cross-sectional average volatility of close-to-close returns, computed in the same 
manner, equals 2,8072% (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Daily returns 
Cross-sectional analysis on 
stock-by-stock average returns 
Weighted mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Number of 
stocks 
Close-to-close average returns  -0,0659%  0,3136% -1,8335% 0,7894%  1450 
Close-to-close returns volatility  2,8072%  1,8036%  0  21,1142%  1450 
 
Concerning transaction costs, the cross-sectional mean of time-weighted average quoted 
spreads is 2,3723% while the volume-weighted average effective spread applied on 
transactions only equals 1,77%, the average effective spread on sales (2,0221%) being 
substantially superior to the average effective spreads on purchases (1,3921%). 
As a measure for depth, the average NMS in GBP equals 9281,55 over the period. 
Furthermore, the level of liquidity for the sample is estimated using the Kyle depth 
coefficient, that is the deviation in price from mid-quote to accept to be able to trade one 
more unit of share. We will calculate this variable in percentage of mid price and will refer to 
it as the unit marginal cost (UMC). Over our sample, the cross-sectional mean of the average 
quoted UMC equals 0,000359% of mid quote. It goes down to 0,000127% when calculated 
with effective spreads applied on trades (see Table 8). Yet, the sample is heterogeneous in 
terms of liquidity, as for the most liquid stock, the average quoted UMC equals 0,000007% 
  11while it rises to 0,028130% for the least one. Differences in liquidity across the sample are 
even more striking, looking at the average effective UMC, the lowest being nearly null 
(0,37.10-8) and the highest one reaching 0,019290%. Tables 7 and 8 provide statistics on 









Minimum Maximum Number of 
stocks 
Time-weighted average quoted spread 2,3723%  1,4875%  0,4847%  28,6074%  1450 
Volume-weighted average effective spread 1,7700%  1,7780%  0,0338%  50,5649%  1450 
V-W average effective spread on purchases  1,3921%  1,3398%  0,0000%  52,6957%  1446 
V-W average effective spread on sales  2,0221%  2,4578%  0,0000%  78,8388%  1449 
 
Table 8 
Unit marginal cost (UMC) in % of mid-price 
Cross-sectional analysis 





Minimum Maximum Number of 
stocks 
Time-weighted average quoted  UMC  0,000359  0,000705 0,000007 0,028130  1450 
Volume-weighted average effective  UMC  0,000127  0,000227 0,00000037 0,019290  1450 
V-W average effective UMC on purchases  0,000141  0,001268  0,000000  1,851852  1446 
V-W average effective UMC on sales  0,000119  0,000239  0,000000  0,020397  1449 
 
Quotes on the stocks of our sample are not very frequently revised: the average number of 
quote revisions per day and per stock is 11,6 (see Table 9). 
Table 9 
Number of quote revisions 
Cross-sectional analysis 





Minimum Maximum Number of 
stocks 
Average daily number of quote revisions  11,6  8,0  1  56  1450 
 
Trading activity within POSIT was substantial for the stocks of the sample. The amount of 
submitted orders reached 43 162 millions of GBP over the period, that is 58,55% of the total 
traded volume on the market. Including resubmissions, this amount goes up to 71  846 
millions of GBP. Institutional investors initiated 51,8% of these orders while market makers 
submitted 48,2%. Selling orders (59,86%) exceed buying orders (40,14%), this imbalance 
being higher for orders placed by market makers. Market makers placed nearly twice (1,9 
times) more sell orders than buy orders in the CN. 
  12If the major part of submitted orders came from institutional investors, most executed orders 
were market maker-initiated (67,69% of the volume executed in POSIT over the period). 
Table 10 displays more details about submissions and executions in the CN over the 
observation period. 
Table 10 
Trading activity in POSIT 






Total submitted volume* in GBP  43 162 465 832  22 356 870 573  20 805 595 259 
- in % of total submitted volume*  100,00% 51,80%  48,20% 
Total number of submitted orders*  123 191  35 663  87 528 
Average size of an submitted order*  350 370  626 893  237 702 
Total submitted buy volume* in GBP  17 326 822 218  10 058 683 880  7 268 138 338 
- in % total submitted volume*  40,14% 23,30%  16,84% 
Total number of submitted buy orders*  42 480  14 484  27 996 
Average size of an submitted buy order*  407 882  694 469  259 613 
Total submitted sell volume* in GBP  25 835 643 615  12 298 186 694  13 537 456 921 
- in % of total submitted volume*  59,86% 28,49%  31,36% 
Total number of submitted sell orders*  80 711  21 179  59 532 
Average size of an submitted sell order*  320 101  580 678  227 398 
Total executed volume in GBP  934 722 524  302 005 599  632 716 925 
- in % total executed volume  100,00% 32,31%  67,69% 
- in % of total market traded volume  1,27% 0,41%  0,86% 
Total executed volume  
over total submitted volume  2,17% 1,35%  3,04% 
Total number of executed orders  7 534  1 848  5 686 
Average size of an executed order  124 067  163 423  111 276 
*  Including new submissions only / excluding resubmissions of unexecuted orders 
 
Before investigating the implications for the market of the CN activity, the testable 
hypotheses ensuing from theoretical models are listed in next subsection. 
4.2. Testable hypotheses 
From theoretical models on fragmentation, we derive a series of testable hypotheses on the 
implication of trading through a CN for market quality. 
  131.  Fragmentation effect vs competition effect 
H1.  The competition effect dominates the fragmentation effect. 
If H1 is true, the effective spread should be negatively related to the share of traded volume 
executed in the CN (positively otherwise). 
2. Adverse  selection 
H2.  The fragmentation of the order flow between the central market and the CN creates 
additional adverse selection costs. 
Under H2, spreads would increase with the share of order flow submitted to POSIT. 
3. Inventory  costs 
H3.  The CN gives an opportunity to market makers to reallocate their positions with no 
implicit trading cost and thus lowers inventory costs. 
Under H4, quoted spreads should be negatively related to the share of volume traded by 
market makers through the CN. 
4.  Unexecuted CN order flow and implicit transaction sots 
H4.  Unexecuted order flow coming back from the CN to the central market for execution, 
creates temporary tension on liquidity, either because it increases adverse selection, as 
demonstrated in Hendershott and Mendelson (200), or because it suddenly generates 
abnormal inventory costs for market makers. 
Provided H3, spreads would widen with the amount of unexecuted CN order flow. 
5. Market  impact 
H5.  Crossing reduces global market impact of trades. 
Given the realisation of H5, the return volatility per unit of traded volume would decrease 
with the share of volume transacted through the CN. 
H6.  Crossing reduces temporary market impact. 
Provided H6, intra-day volatility around VWAP would be negatively related to the share of 
traded volume executed in the CN. 
H7.  Crossing reduces short-term volatility around fundamental value. 
Under H7, the ratio hourly return volatility over daily return volatility would decrease with 
the share of traded volume executed in the CN. 
5.  Informed trading and efficiency 
H8.  Informed traders submit more orders to the CN than to the central market. 
Returns could then be explained not only by buy and sell trades on the market but also by 
buy and sell orders submitted to the CN. 
  14H9.  As for the implications of H8 for efficiency, the following alternative will be tested: 
either informed trading through the CN harms efficiency and slows down the discovery 
of prices (H9a), or, by increasing the total proportion of informed trading on the market, 
crosses in the CN accelerate the discovery of prices (H9b). 
If H9a (H9b) holds, then the number of quote revisions per day would decrease (increase) 
with the share of order flow (either submitted or executed) going to the CN. 
H10.  Finally, if crossing accelerates quote revisions, does it effectively speed up the discovery 
of prices (H10a), or does it just make the process of discovery more complex (H10b)? 
Under H10a (H10b), the lower the share of order flow (either submitted or executed) going to 
the CN, the later (the earlier) price movements would take place within the trading day. 
5.  Methodology and results 
The methodology consists of a cross-sectional analysis on stock-by-stock average measures, 
as a preparatory work to a stock-by-stock temporal analysis. We first define the variables 
used in the cross-sectional regressions and then give the results. 
5.1. Variables and notations 
Dependent variables 
Our analysis uses as dependent variables average spreads, measures of volatility, average 
daily returns and the average number of quote changes per day. 
–   is the average quoted touch or market spread (i.e. the difference between the best 
offer and the best bid quoted on the market reported to the mid-quote), for stock i, 
calculated by weighting each quoted spread with its time of validity. 
i QS






 is the empirical standard deviation of close-to-close returns on the observation 
period for stock i divided by the average daily traded volume in GBP. This variable 
measures the impact of trading volumes on prices. 
–   is the average standard deviation of trade prices from VWAP during the 
trading day. VWAP is the volume-weighted average price of the stock on a given trading 
day and is used by operators as a benchmark either to price transactions or to valuate 
trading performance.   measures short-term volatility around the mean level of 
prices due to implicit transaction costs and market impact of trades. 
( i VWAP σ )
) ( i VWAP σ









 is considered as a proxy for short-term volatility around fundamental value. It 
reports the sum of hourly return variances to σ , the variance of open-to-close 
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–   is the mean of daily returns calculated in logarithm on closing mid-quotes for stock i.  i R
–   is the average number of quote revisions per day. As a dependent variable, it is a 
proxy for the speed of price adjustment to information. 
i NQ
–   is computed to measure, for each stock i, the speed of price adjustment throughout 
the trading day. It is the mean of the different hours (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 8.5) of the trading 










































The higher  , the later price movements take place within the MQP.  i SP
Control variables 
For each dependent variables, control variables are determined by running stepwise linear 
regressions of the dependent variable over a range of possibly explaining variables and 
keeping the most powerful model. For each dependant variable, the results from the 
stepwise regressions confirm theoretical and intuitive predictions. Table 11 describes the 
selected control variables and Table 12 exhibits, for each dependent variable, the 
corresponding control variables 
Explaining variables 
Our analysis consists of examining the effects of variables measuring the trading activity in 
the CN, on the dependent variables we have defined. These CN-activity related variables are: 
–  , which is the total volume in GBP traded through POSIT for stock i over the period, 
in percentage of the total volume (in GBP) of stock i traded on the market, 
i X
–  , which is the total amount in GBP of orders submitted to POSIT on stock i reported 
to the total market traded volume, including new submissions only and excluding 
resubmissions of unexecuted orders, 
i NS
  16Table 11 




i σ   Standard deviation of daily returns for stock i 
i TV   Logarithm of the total volume in GBP traded on stock i over the period 
i BTV   Logarithm of the total amount in GBP of buying trades on stock i 
i STV   Logarithm of the total amount in GBP of selling trades on stock i 
i NMS   Logarithm of the average NMS (in GBP) of stock i 
i QS   Average quoted market spread for stock i 
i ES   Average effective spread weighted by trade volumes for stock i 
i EUMC   Average effective marginal cost of one share for stock i 
i NQ   Average number of quote revisions per day for stock i 
i NT   Average number of trades per day for stock i 
Table 12 
Correspondence between dependent variables and control variables 
Dependant variable  Control variables 
i QS   i σ ,TV ,   i i NQ
i ES   i σ ,TV ,   i i NMS
i i DTV σ   i ES ,   i EUMC
() i VWAP σ   i QS , ,TV ,   i σ i i NT
() ( ) i
2
i
2 oc h σ σ   i NT ,TV ,QS ,   i i i NQ
i R   i BTV ,   i STV
i QN   i NT , ,TV ,σ   i NMS i i
i SP   i TV , ,QS ,   i NT i i NQ
 
–  , which is the total amount in GBP of all orders submitted to POSIT on stock i reported 
to the total market traded volume, including resubmissions of unexecuted orders, 
i S
– U , which is the total amount in GBP of unexecuted POSIT orders reported to the total 
market traded volume for stock i (U ), 
i
i i i X NS − =
–  , which is the total volume in GBP of stock i traded by market makers through 
POSIT, in percentage of the total volume (in GBP) of stock i traded on the market, 
i XM
–  , which is the total volume in GBP of stock i traded by institutional investors through 
POSIT, in percentage of the total volume (in GBP) of stock i traded on the market, 
i XI
  17–  , which is the total amount in GBP of buy orders submitted to POSIT by institutional 
investors on stock i reported to the total market traded volume, 
i SBI
–  , which is the total amount in GBP of sell orders submitted to POSIT by institutional 
investors on stock i reported to the total market traded volume, 
i SSI
–  , which is the total amount in GBP of buy orders submitted to POSIT by market 
makers on stock i reported to the total market traded volume, 
i SBM
–  , which is the total amount in GBP of sell orders submitted to POSIT by market 
makers on stock i reported to the total market traded volume. 
i SSM
5.2. Fragmentation effect vs competition effect 
First, to test H1, we regress, as shown in equation (1), the average effective spread on  , the 
share of the CN in the total traded volume for stock i, controlling for  , TV  and  . 
i X
i i σ i NMS
i i i i i i eX dNMS cTV b a ES ε σ+ + + + + =   (1) 
By running a linear OLS-regression on our 1450 observations, we obtained 
i i
) 161 , 0 (
2
i
) 645 , 3 (
i
) 554 , 10 (
i
) 022 , 20 ( ) 874 , 25 (




  (2), 
with R²=48,6%. 
The e coefficient is negative but not significantly different from zero. Running the regression 
on the sub-sample of the 562 stocks effectively traded through the CN over the period, the 
results become: 
i i
) 878 , 2 (
i
) 988 , 1 (
i
) 615 , 1 (
i
) 98 , 8 ( ) 459 , 5 (
i X 156 , 0 NMS 343 , 0 TV 255 , 0 509 , 0 77 , 8 ES ε σ+ − − − + =
− − −
  (3), 
with R²=19,7%. 
e is significantly negative at a 1% level in equation (3). According to these results, the 
fragmentation is not dominant, and the domination of the competition effect is slight. 
5.3. Adverse selection 
Regressions (4) and (5) tests H2: 
i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 i NS e NQ d TV c b a QS ε σ + + + + = +   (4), 
i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 2 i NS e NMS d TV c b a ES ε σ+ + + + + =   (5). 
The estimates given in equations (6) and (7) show that the relative amount of orders 
submitted to the CN has a negative impact on quoted spreads and no significant effect on 
  18effective spreads, which allow us to conclude that it does not create additional adverse 
selection costs. 
i 1 i
) 082 , 3 (
4
i
) 082 , 3 (
2
i
) 113 , 25 (
i
) 228 , 27 ( ) 031 , 31 (











) 327 , 0 (
5
i
) 730 , 3 (
i
) 442 , 10 (
i
) 033 , 20 ( ) 957 , 25 (
i NS 10 . 936 , 1 NMS 443 , 0 TV 897 , 0 865 , 0 782 , 19 ES ε σ+ + − − + = −
− −




5.4. Inventory costs 
To test H3, we run the regression (8), first on the total sample, secondly on a sub-sample 
consisting of the 562 stocks for which trades have been executed through the CN. 
i i i i i i dXM cNQ cTV b a QS ε σ+ + + + + =   (8) 
Results for the total sample (1450 stocks) show that quoted spreads are negatively related to 
the relative amount of transactions traded by market makers through POSIT but the negative 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero (see equation 9). 
i i
) 234 , 1 (
i
) 958 , 2 (
2
i
) 217 , 24 (
i
) 237 , 26 ( ) 25 , 30 (








Focusing on the sub-sample (562 stocks), this negative effect becomes significant at a 1% 
threshold (see equation 10), meaning that trading in the CN reduces inventory costs for 
market makers and allow them to tighten quotes. 
i i
) 604 , 4 (
i
) 301 , 6 (
2
i
) 503 , 6 (
i
) 824 , 17 ( ) 996 , 8 (








5.5. Unexecuted order flow and implicit transaction costs 
H4 is tested through regressions (11) and (12): 
i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 i NS e NQ d TV c b a QS ε σ + + + + = +   (11), 
i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 2 i NS e NMS d TV c b a ES ε σ+ + + + + =   (12), 
first on the total sample, second on the sub-sample of the stocks actually traded in the CN. 
The results displayed in equations (13), (14), (15) and (16) show that the unexecuted order 
flow in the CN does not significantly harm liquidity. 
On the whole sample: 
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On the sub-sample (562 stocks): 
i i
) 472 , 1 (
4
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) 968 , 6 (
2
i
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) 538 , 0 (
4
i
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i
) 05 , 1 (
i
) 579 , 9 ( ) 507 , 4 (
i U 10 . 9 , 2 NMS 417 , 0 TV 167 , 0 538 , 0 561 , 7 ES ε σ+ + − − + = −
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5.6. Market impact 





: crosses through POSIT have no 
significant effect on the global market impact of trades. Yet, regression (17) indicates that 
they reduce temporary market impact and validates H6. 
()
%) 4 , 43 R ( X 10 . 85 , 3 TV 114 , 0
NT 10 . 171 , 4 QS 1 , 0 116 , 0 78 , 1 VWAP
2
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However, this negative effect is mainly due to market makers crosses, as shown in regression 
(18). 
()
%) 5 , 43 R ( XI 10 . 21 , 1 XM 10 . 28 , 6
TV 107 , 0 NT 10 . 2 , 4 QS 10 . 987 , 9 115 , 0 784 , 1 VWAP
2
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H7, tested in regression (19), is rather similar to H6, except that it focuses on short-term 
volatility around fundamental value, as the dependent variable reports hourly return 
volatility to open-to-close return volatility. According to the estimates, the excess of short-
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5.7. Informed trading and efficiency 
Another issue of interest is the informational content of orders submitted to the CN. One 
may fairly wonder whether orders anonymously submitted to POSIT convey more 
information than orders executed on the market. In order to test this hypothesis (H8), as 
shown in regression (20), average daily returns are regressed on market buy and sell trade 
volumes and on the relative amounts of buy and sell orders submitted to POSIT by 
institutional investors on the one hand, by market makers on the other hand. 
i i i i i i i i gSSM fSBM eSSI dSBI cSTV bBTV a R ε + + + + + + + =   (20). 
The results of the regression displayed in equation (21) are somehow disappointing. The R² 
coefficient is very low, which means that buying and selling trade volumes are not efficient 
control variables for  .  i R
%) 4 , 2 R ( SSI 10 . 63 , 7 SBI 10 . 278 , 2
SSM 10 . 15 , 1 SBM 10 . 442 , 1 STV 10 . 21 , 7 BTV 10 . 081 , 7 10 . 29 , 7 R
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Yet, average returns are significantly related to the POSIT order flow coming from market 
makers: they are positively (negatively) related to the relative amount of buy (sell) orders 
submitted by market makers into the CN. However, we can not conclude to a predictive 
power on returns of these variables, as the regression is run on average or aggregated 
measures over the whole period. For further interpretations, a analysis on stock by stock 
temporal series will be carried out. 
Finally, in order to test H9, i.e. the effect of the CN activity on price discovery, the 
coefficients in regressions (22) and (23) are estimated: 
i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 i S g QS f e NMS d TV c NT b a NQ ε σ + + + + + + = +
+
  (22), 
i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 i 2 2 i X g QS f e NMS d TV c NT b a NQ ε σ + + + + + + =   (23). 
Equations (24) and (25) lay out the results: 
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They show that invisible submissions to POSIT do not slow down the discovery of prices and 
conversely, executions in POSIT accelerate quote revisions, which validates H9b. 
Yet, we may still wonder if the acceleration of quote revisions actually make price 
adjustments faster (H10). Testing the impact of S  and   on   in regressions (26) and 
(27), we confirm that submissions to POSIT do not slow down the discovery of prices, but we 
can not validate H10a: though the effect of   on   is negative, it is not significant. 
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Yet, it is worth denoting that, splitting   in its two components   and  , there is a 
significantly negative effect of   upon   (regression 28): we may then assess that 
market makers' trading in the CN accelerate the discovery of prices. 
i X i XM i XI
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We do not find that trading through a CN create additional adverse selection costs, 
conversely to what predicts information-based theoretical models on multi-system trading. 
Our results assess that, when a CN operates on a dealership market, the competition effect 
dominates the fragmentation effect. Moreover, the CN is used as a liquidity-providing 
system reducing inventory costs. Finally, executions through the CN accelerate quote 
revisions, and facilitates the discovery of prices for market makers. 
  22Appendix 1: Order constraints available in POSIT 
To control over unpredictable match outcomes, a range of constraints can be applied to 
either individual stocks, pairs of stocks or to single or dual direction lists. 
Price constraints 
Price limits may be attached to an order to protect against adverse price movements in the 
market between the time the order is sent and the match time. The constraint simply 
indicates whether your order is available for the match pool, but does not generate any 
external information. The only price at which a match can occur in POSIT is at the mid-point 
of the current bid/offer spread. For example, if a price limit on a buy order is 450 and the 
ruling mid price is 452, then the order does not participate in the match. If the mid price was 
448, then the order would be included in the match and executed at 448, but not at 450. This 
constraint is at individual stock levels and may only be applied in the currency of the 
primary price quote. 
Minimum shares 
The ability to set a minimum number of shares to trade out of a total order size per stock or 
for all stocks in a portfolio or list is available in POSIT. Clients may wish to receive no fills of 
less than 25,000 across a list for example. For a particularly large order, of say 1 million 
shares, a minimum fill of 250,000 in that line alone may be required. 
Minimum value 
Like the minimum share constraint above, it may be appropriate, particularly for a list of 
stock with varying prices, to set a minimum value, of say £50,000 per stock. This constraint 
can be set in any currency that is held on the system, such as British Pounds, US Dollars, 
Euros, etc.  
Cash imbalance 
For a portfolio, list or pair of orders, a cash imbalance constraint is available relating to the 
maximum amount that buy orders can exceed sell orders or vice versa, both in absolute 
value terms and by shares, if appropriate. This constraint is particularly useful for (a) 
generally in managing the results of unpredictable match outcomes, (b) ensuring that 
available cash for investment as a result of, say, a restructuring is not compromised but 
overbuying or (c) ensuring that any necessary cash is raised, where required. For example, 
the constraint may be that buy orders on a list cannot come into operation until £5m of sales 
has been achieved. 
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